Research

Job Market Paper

(with Paul Schäfer)

Abstract: When firms exploit behavioral biases it is natural to think that, eventually, consumers will learn to avoid their mistakes, limiting their exploitation. Profit maximizing firms, however, have an incentive to undermine such learning. We study the consumer learning dynamics and the firm's response in a multi-unit descending price auction with a simultaneous fixed price offer. In our panel of 8 million bids by 280.000 bidders, consumers often bid more than the fixed price. Depending on competing bids, an overbid can lead to paying more than the fixed price (overpaying). We argue overpaying increases the saliency of the consumers' mistake by making it payoff relevant, which is likely to affect consumer learning. Indeed, bidders who overpay subsequently overbid less often and are more likely to leave the market compared to bidders who similarly overbid but did not overpay. We show the resulting loss in future profits makes overpaying undesirable, and document a structural break in our data at which the firm eliminates such overpayments --- and the resulting consumer learning --- through changes in how it runs its auctions. Methodologically, we discuss identification of our treatment effects using causal graphs and show how these treatment effects identify a three-type structural model of bidder behavior with learning dynamics.

Working Paper

Managerial Overconfidence in Europe

(with David Zeimentz and Dennis Gottschlich) - Working Paper coming soon!

Abstract: We study the impact of managerial overconfidence on investment cash-flow sensitivity, innovation and CEO compensation using data from France, Germany and the UK. Using self-collected stock trades and option exercises of C-suite directors, we revisit the canonical overconfidence classification and discuss the portability of the approach from the US to Europe. Exploiting the fact that we observe managers at different stages of their professional life, we propose a novel classification to disentangle optimism and overestimation of managerial ability. On the methodological side, we discuss the canonical identification strategies in this literature using causal graphs.

Work in Progress

Stock Options for Rank and File Employees

(single authored)

Abstract: Coming Soon!